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GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 This appeal presents us with two issues.  First, 
whether a debtor in a chapter 13 bankruptcy may modify the rights 
of an undersecured mortgage lender under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) 
and 11 U.S.C.§ 506(a) when the mortgage is secured by both real 
and personal property.  Second, whether a pre-petition 
foreclosure judgment precludes modification of the mortgagee's 
secured claim because the terms of the mortgage have "merged" 
into the foreclosure judgment.  The district court held that 
modification was appropriate and was not precluded by merger.  We 
affirm. 
 I. 
 Appellee Lillie M. Johns ("Ms. Johns") purchased a 
house in Chester, Pennsylvania on April 29, 1986, with the help 
of a loan secured by a mortgage that was later assigned to 
Rousseau Mortgage Corporation ("Rousseau").  The mortgage covered 
Ms. Johns' home as well as "any and all appliances, machinery, 
furniture and equipment (whether fixtures or not) of any nature 
whatsoever now or hereafter installed in or upon said premises."  
Appellee's Appendix 31. 
 At some time prior to filing in bankruptcy, and 
following over a year's delinquency on the part of Ms. Johns, the 
Delaware County Court of Common Pleas entered a foreclosure 
judgment against Ms. Johns and in favor of Rousseau in the amount 
of $39,557.15. 
 It was stipulated in the bankruptcy court that the fair 
market value of Ms. Johns' residence was $8,000, and that the 
value of her appliances, machinery, furniture and equipment 
("personalty") was $1,000. 
 On April 15, 1993, shortly before the planned 
foreclosure sale, Ms. Johns filed a voluntary petition for relief 
under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Thereafter, Ms. Johns 
instituted an adversary action in bankruptcy court against 
Rousseau to limit Rousseau's claim to the fair market value of 
the mortgaged premises.  By Order of November 4, 1993, the 
bankruptcy court, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), bifurcated 
Rousseau's interest into a secured claim of $9,000 and an 
unsecured claim of $30,557.15, holding that the anti-modification 
provision of 11 U.S.C. §1322(b)(2) did not prohibit a 
modification of the debtor's indebtedness where the secured claim 
was secured by personalty as well as an interest in the debtor's 
principal residence.  The bankruptcy court also rejected 
Rousseau's argument that the mortgage foreclosure judgment 
precluded reliance on the mortgage's "additional security" 
provisions because the mortgage had merged into the judgment. 
 Rousseau appealed to the district court, which, by 
Memorandum and Order dated March 17, 1994, affirmed the order of 
the bankruptcy court.  This appeal followed. 
 Because this case was submitted on a stipulated record 
and presents issues of statutory interpretation and conclusions 
of law only, our standard of review is plenary.  Brown v. 
Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union, 851 F.2d 81, 84 (3d 
Cir. 1988). 
 II. 
 Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code permits debtors to 
structure repayment of their indebtedness through a plan approved 
by the bankruptcy court.  Section 1322(b) lists ten provisions 
which Chapter 13 debtors may, at their option, include in their 
bankruptcy plans.  Section 1322(b)(2) in particular provides that 
a debtor's plan may: 
 modify the rights of holders of secured 
claims, other than a claim secured only by a 
security interest in real property that is 
the debtor's principal residence, or of 
holders of unsecured claims, or leave 
unaffected the rights of holders of any class 
of claims. 
(emphasis added).  This provision thus allows modification of the 
rights of both secured and unsecured creditors, with the 
exception that the rights of creditors whose claims are secured 
only by a mortgage on the debtor's principal residence may not be 
modified. 
 Section 506(a) defines allowed1 secured and allowed 
unsecured claims as follows: 
 An allowed secured claim of a creditor 
secured by a lien on property in which the 
estate has an interest . . . is a secured 
claim to the extent of the value of such 
creditor's interest in the estate's interest 
in such property . . . and is an unsecured 
claim to the extent that the value of such 
creditor's interest . . . is less than the 
amount of such allowed claim. 
Section  506(a) thus "provides that a claim is secured only to 
the extent of the value of the property on which the lien is 
fixed."  United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 
235, 239, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1029 (1989).  Any surplus is, by 
definition, unsecured. 
 We have recently held in In re Hammond, 27 F.3d 52 (3d 
Cir. 1994) that the Bankruptcy Code did not preclude bifurcation 
of a secured interest in a personal residence when personalty 
also secured the debtor's loan.  In so holding we have re-
affirmed the continuing vitality of a prior holding of this Court 
reached in Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortg. Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3d 
Cir. 1990). 
 In Wilson we held that the anti-modification provision 
of § 1322(b)(2) does not prohibit modification of the unsecured 
portion of an undersecured mortgage on the debtor's principal 
residence.  This holding was overturned by the Supreme Court in 
Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 2106 
                     
1
.   An "allowed" claim is one that will serve as the basis 
for distribution. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a). 
(1993).  However, our decision in Wilson in favor of the 
mortgagor-debtor was also based on a second and alternative 
ground.  Having noted that the mortgage agreement in question 
covered not only real estate but personalty as well, we concluded 
that:  
 [T]he anti-modification provision of section 1322 does 
not bar the bankruptcy court's order [limiting the 
creditor's allowed secured claim to the fair market 
value of the principal residence] because the 
creditor's interest was not secured only by real 
property as required by the statute.  By its express 
terms, § 1322 prohibits modification of a creditor's 
rights only when the creditor's claim is "secured only 
by a security interest in real property that is the 
creditor's principal residence."   
Wilson, 895 F.2d at 128; see also Sapos v. Provident Inst. of 
Sav. in Town of Boston, 967 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1992).  Nobelman 
did not address, and hence did not disturb, this alternative 
ground of decision. 
 Thus, in Hammond we reasserted and upheld the principle 
that bifurcation is available when a mortgage secures both the 
residence and personal property of the debtor.  The Hammonds had 
given Commonwealth a purchase money mortgage on their home and on 
"any and all appliances, machinery" etc. installed in their home.  
The security interest given in Hammond cannot be distinguished 
from the security interest given by Ms. Johns to Rousseau.  
Hence, the present case is in all relevant respects 
indistinguishable from, and therefore controlled by, Hammond.  
See Internal Operating Procedure 9.1.2  Indeed, Rousseau's 
                     
2
.   I.O.P. 9.1 states that: 
  
supplemental brief, filed shortly after our decision in Hammond 
was handed down, at least implicitly acknowledged that Hammond 
governs our decision here by focusing almost exclusively on 
reasons why Hammond should be overruled as inconsistent with 
Nobelman.   
 III. 
 Rousseau also contends that because the mortgage has 
been foreclosed, the terms of the mortgage "merge" into the 
foreclosure judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas 
and thereby cease to exist, leaving Rousseau with a security 
interest which does not include Ms. Johns' personalty.  
Accordingly, Rousseau argues that Nobelman precludes bifurcation 
of the remaining security interest - that is the residence - into 
secured and unsecured interests.3 
 Rousseau notes that in In re Stendardo, 991 F.2d 1089 
(3d Cir. 1993) we held that where a foreclosure judgment had been 
entered on a mortgage containing no specific language preserving 
a debtor's obligation to pay taxes and insurance premiums beyond 
the date of the judgment, the mortgagee could not rely on the 
terms of the mortgage for recoupment of advances made for taxes 
(..continued) 
 It is the tradition of this court that the holding of a 
panel in a reported opinion is binding on subsequent 
panels.  No subsequent panel overrules a holding in a 
published opinion of a previous panel.  Court in banc 
consideration is required to do so.   
3
.  The same issue raised here was also raised in In re Hammond, 
27 F.3d 52 (3d Cir. 1994).  We did not address it at that time, 
however, because the appellant had not argued the merger issue to 
the district court. 
and insurance.  From this, Rousseau argues that all specific 
terms of the mortgage were merged into the judgment, leaving 
Rousseau with a security interest in Ms. Johns' residence alone 
because § 1322(b)(2) evinces Congress' intention to protect home 
mortgage lenders from cram-downs. 
 We are not attracted by this argument.  If Rousseau's 
rights under § 1322(b)(2) were to be determined solely because it 
was the holder of a judicial lien rather than the holder of a 
mortgage then it could not claim protection under the anti-
modification provision because that provision "applies only to 
claims secured by a 'security interest' in the debtor's 
house. . .." First Nat. Fidelity Corp. v. Perry, 945 F.2d 61, 64 
(3d Cir. 1991), and Perry, referring to the Code, defines a 
security interest "as a lien created by an agreement" 11 U.S.C. § 
101(51).  It is clear that a judgment lien is not "created by 
agreement." 
 In Perry, however, we also held that a "security 
interest" within the meaning of § 1322(b)(2) continues to exist 
after a foreclosure judgment.  Thus in determining whether the 
protections of § 1322(b)(2) attach, we require that the security 
interest created by the parties be analyzed as we discussed 
above.  The security interest created by Ms. Johns' original 
mortgagee and then assigned to Rousseau included Ms. Johns' 
personal property as well as her principal residence.  In that 
circumstance, we have held in Hammond, supra, that modification 
of the security interest is not barred by the operation of § 
1322(b)(2). 
 Moreover, Rousseau has not demonstrated why it should 
be favored over other secured creditors just by virtue of having 
reduced its claim to a foreclosure judgment.  Rousseau has 
furnished us with no authority which would justify a holding that 
Rousseau was entitled to be placed in a superior position 
compared to other secured creditors simply because it has 
relinquished a security interest that was taken in the original 
transaction with Ms. Johns.  The original contract with Ms. 
Johns, which specified that the mortgagee would be secured not 
only by a mortgage on her principal residence but also by a 
security interest in her personalty, fell within the exception 
found in § 1322(b)(2).  Rousseau cannot now escape from that 
exception by relying on its status as the holder of a non-
consensual judgment and thereby gain the protection that had 
originally been given up when a security interest in both real 
and personal property had been sought and taken.  Nor can it 
obtain that protection by now foregoing part of the security, 
i.e. the personalty, which it originally required. 
 Our holding in Perry that a security interest continued 
to exist after a foreclosure judgment was based in large part on 
our concern that to hold otherwise would frustrate the clear 
intentions of Congress:  "If modification of the lender's rights 
were permissible after it secured a foreclosed judgment, the 
[antimodification] assurance afforded by § 1322(b)(2) would be 
rendered largely illusory."  Perry at 65.  The same holds true of 
the exception to that section's antimodification protections. 
 Thus, although the foreclosure judgment terminated the  
mortgage, i.e. the contractual relationship between Ms. Johns and 
now Rousseau, see Matter of Roach, 824 F.2d 1370 (3d Cir. 1987), 
the security interest taken by Rousseau survives in toto and that 
interest must, as we have previously explained, include 
Rousseau's security interest in Ms. Johns' personalty.  This 
being so, § 1322(b)(2) operates to permit modification into 
secured and unsecured interests, as the bankruptcy and district 
court held. 
 IV. 
 Having held that § 1322(b)(2) does not bar modification 
of a mortgage which is secured by both real and personal property 
and having held that a pre-petition foreclosure judgment cannot 
bar modification of the mortgagee's secured claim by reason of 
"merger," we will affirm the March 17, 1994 judgment of the 
district court. 
